With the U.S. not participating in regional economic integration for the past four years, after the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) early in its term, RCEP is a publicity stunt for Beijing. And China desperately needed such a coup: across the region, countries are still angry at how Beijing hid the first COVID-19 outbreak and are also furious at how China has continued to assert its territorial claims, although the pandemic is hampering many regional states. Nevertheless, as the EU, we should be very careful and attentive to the strategic challenges associated with it: the Indo-Pacific region is of strategic importance to us. We must strengthen our commitment to ensuring that our voice is heard and that the overall architecture of regional cooperation remains open and regulated. India and the US were due to become members of RCEP and CPTPP respectively, but withdrew under the Modi and Trump governments. Now that the agreements are set up (see Figure 1), they strongly stimulate intranerostasiatic integration around China and Japan. This is partly the result of American policy. The United States must rebalance its economic and security strategies to promote not only its economic interests, but also its security objectives. Southeast Asia will benefit greatly from RCEP ($19 billion per year until 2030), but less than Northeast Asia, since it already has free trade agreements with RCEP partners. However, rcep could improve access to China`s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funds and increase the benefits of market access by strengthening transport, energy and communication links.

RCEP`s favourable rules of origin will also attract foreign investment. According to forecasts for 2020, the agreement is expected to increase the global economy by $186 billion. [7] [15] At the same time, we need to go further. . . .